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This paper proposes a unified conceptual framework to analyse the multiple role 
and consequences of patents in the case of biotechnology research tools. We 
argue that the knowledge/information and independent/complementary nature of 
research tools define heterogeneous frameworks in which the patent system 
plays different roles. In particular, using the analogy with the free-libre open 
source movement in software, we show that patents can promote open 
innovation by ensuring the freedom of some pieces of knowledge. A strong 
conclusion of the paper is therefore that, against common belief, an adequate use 
of the patent system may contribute to preserving freedom of access to upstream 
research tools within a framework that we call free-libre biotechnology. 
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This paper proposes a unified conceptual framework to analyse the multiple role and 
consequences of patents when innovation is sequential, i.e. when second stage innovations 
build on first stage innovations. Specifically, we consider the case of biotechnology research 
tools, which are inputs into the process of developing new biotech drugs, plants, etc. Using 
the analogy with the free-libre open source movement in software, we propose an enlarged 
view of the patent system by arguing that patents can provide different solutions when 
confronted with varied situations (Cohen et al., 2000; Arora et al., 2003; Bureth et al., 2005). 
 
In particular, we assume that the knowledge/information and independent/complementary 
nature of research tools define heterogeneous frameworks and in each of these frameworks 
the patent system plays a different role. A strong conclusion of the paper is that, against 
common belief, an adequate use of the patent system may contribute to preserving free access 
to research tools within a framework that we call free-libre biotechnology (Burk, 2002; 
Maurer, 2003; Burk and Boettiger, 2004; David, 2006). 
 
There has been a recent focus of attention on research tools within academic and policy-
related literature, as indicated by the abundant literature on research tools (NRC, 1997; Heller 
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   1 and Eisenberg, 1998; Walsh, Arora and Cohen, 2003; Nelson, 2004). Research tools 
foundational position within the innovation process in modern biotechnology makes their 
mode of appropriation a core issue. Since they are inputs in the innovation process, strategies 
of exclusion based on strong patents may impede second stage innovations that need to use 
research tools. Conversely, lack of an adequate appropriation environment may decrease the 
incentives to construct research tools. A fine balance must therefore be respected when 
dealing with the issue of research tool patents
1. 
 
Regarding the double objective to allow for a wide use of research tools and to provide firms 
with incentives to innovate and build new research tools, we explore in this paper the solution 
provided by the pioneering example of free-libre open source software (FLOSS). It may 
indeed be appealing to transpose the FLOSS model to biotechnology research tools since 
detailed analyses of the software industry suggest that FLOSS can provide a solution to 
reconcile incentives to innovate with wide dissemination of software outputs in a context of 
sequential innovation. 
 
The FLOSS movement was developed in the 1980s and was linked to the emergence of 
strategies of appropriation and exclusion within the software industry
2 (Lessig, 2001). 
Worried about the consequences of the surge in appropriation, which may deter collaborations 
and open access to software, Richard Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation (FSF) 
in 1984. The latter aimed at promoting collective and decentralised development of software 
and specifically of free software, an important feature of which was disclosure of the source 
code
3. In order to ensure the freedom (in the sense of the French meaning of the word, i.e. 
libre and not gratuit) of software the FSF developed an original exploitation licence: The 
General Public Licence (GPL) also known as copyleft. The GPL ensures that everybody can 
use, modify, copy and even distribute any software “protected” by the licence under the 
unique condition that these changes continue to be copylefted, meaning that improvements 
must remain accessible and open to modifications by everybody. GPL is therefore a viral 
license since it reproduces itself with each modified or extended version of software that used 
copylefted software. In the last decade FLOSS has proved to be a major success with some 
libre-software, such as Linux, Apache, Sendmail, MySQL and Perl (LAMP), widely adopted 
all around the planet. 
 
FLOSS, in part due to its commercial success, have triggered a tremendous number of studies 
(Lerner and Tirole, 2001 and 2002; Nuvolari, 2001; Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2002; Dalle and 
Jullien, 2003; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Jullien and Zimermann, 2006). This interest is 
understandable since FLOSS proposes a radically new vision on organisations and more 
                                                 
1 The question of the effect of patents on incentives to produce and circulate research tool is far from 
straightforward. As emphasised by many examples, a wide circulation of the research tools based on low 
licensing fees does not mean to renounce making important profits out of the research tool (see for instance the 
Cohen-Boyer patent on recombinant DNA). Similarly, high licensing fees may not always prevent the diffusion 
of the research tool (as suggested by the example of the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) technology) (NRC, 
1997). 
2 The 1980s saw the emergence of the first patents for software. Initially software was considered to depend 
exclusively on copyright legislation due to its algorithmic content. But following the Diamond vs. Diehr case 
(1981), patents began to be granted to software designers who could also continue to be granted copyrights 
(since patents and copyrights protect two different parts of the software). Software can therefore be given a 
double layer of protection: a patent for its design, and a copyright for the source code and this without any 
requirement to disclose the source code. 
3 Following Maurer (2003), in the broadest sense open source software are any software published with human 
readable source code. Hence, OSS may not necessarily be free but free software, by definition, includes the 
disclosure of the source code. 
   2 specifically new insights regarding the incentives that drive individuals and the way they 
interact. 
 
The question of incentives to participate in FLOSS project has been studied not only for the 
individuals, for whom intrinsic motivations may play a major role, but also for firms. The 
latter have developed business models that enable them to derive money from participation to 
FLOSS (Lerner and Tirole, 2001; Jullien and Zimermann, 2006). Even though the underlying 
software is open source, i.e. anyone can view and copy it, a firm’s revenue can be based on 
the services and products that it provides complementary to the software such as installation, 
teaching manuals, teaching courses, customisation and security, other complementary 
software, etc. In other words, firms that join the OSS movement usually make money by 
providing services or products associated with the software and not by selling the software 
itself, which therefore does not need to be protected. 
 
Empirical and theoretical studies suggest that FLOSS may reconcile the apparently opposite 
goals of providing incentives to do research and ensuring a wide dissemination of the research 
results. Applying the principles of FLOSS to research tools is therefore appealing because the 
patent system does not appear to provide a satisfying balance between the necessary freedom 
of use of research tools and the incentives to produce those tools. Although the central role of 
patents in the birth and development of the biotechnology industry three decades ago is not 
questioned, there are many concerns nowadays that research tools are over protected and that 
too strong patents lead to restricting access to materials and techniques that are critical for 
future research and therefore may impede the pace of innovation in life sciences (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998; Nelson, 2004). 
 
Yet, since research tools are inputs in the development of further applications it is highly 
important that they remain easily available. We propose therefore the elaboration of a 
framework based on the example of FLOSS that would favour collaboration, collective 
innovation and ensure the freedom of research tools. This framework we call free-libre 
biotechnology. As copyright in software has been turn to copyleft, we show that patents can 
be turned in such a way to ensure free utilisation of research tools and therefore can help to 
promote free-libre biotechnology. Patents are flexible instruments that can be used in multiple 
manners. As David (2006) proposes, one can envisage hijacking the traditional role of patents 
by “using IPR to expand the commons for science”: 
 
“Less notice has been taken, however, of what may be called “the third face of IPR.” 
This is the legal protection of private rights to arrange contracts for common-use, 
thereby creating “club goods” that permit the participants to share access to the 
information and its utilization under conditions that emulate those of the public 
domain, but which may be enforced by invoking the rights of the original intellectual 
property owners. The contractually constructed, IPR-based “information commons”, 
thus, is a natural device for the socially efficient pooling of research results, 
particularly those that take the form of tools for exploratory science. It is, like the 
application of certain forms of copyright licensing – such as the GNU GPL in the case 
of open source software, a form of ‘legal jujitsu’, Yochai Benkler’s (2006) 
marvellously acute characterization of the strategy of deploying the law intellectual 




   3 This possibly new role for the patent system leads us to propose a unified framework to 
analyse the many different uses of patent with respect to research tools. We consider two 
dimensions of research tools: as complementary vs. independent in use and knowledge based 
vs. information based, which defines four very different contexts for conceptualising research 
tools. For each one of these contexts, we analyse the role of the patent system and discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of this instrument. The basic idea being that the more we converge 
towards a complementary and knowledge based view of research tools, the more important it 
is to guarantee the freedom of research tools. 
 
Section 2 defines research tools and discusses the merits of patents with respect to the 
production and distribution of research tools. Section 3 introduces and discusses, through 
various examples, the notion of free-libre biotechnology. Specifically it explores the role of 
patents to promote the construction and preservation of a common, open platform of research 
tools. Finally, in section 4 we propose a framework to analyse the role of patents according to 




2. Research tools and the patent issue 
 
A research tool is used for research purposes and is not considered, in its own right, as an 
application. In particular, research tools are knowledge that may either be: embodied, such as 
in scientific instruments and research materials; or disembodied, such as a technique 
employed during research (Scotchmer, 2004). Specifically, in biomedical science a research 
tool is “any tangible or informational input into the process of discovering a drug or any other 
medical therapy or method of diagnosing disease” (Walsh, Arora and Cohen, 2003). 
 
Research tools are part of a sequential process of innovation, being situated upstream from the 
development of applications such as new drugs for instance. These follow-on innovations are 
thus drawn from the previous invention, diffusion and usage of research tools. In clear, 
research tools serve as a springboard, lay foundations for downstream innovations. 
Researchers are in a sense consumers of research tools. This attribute of research tools as 
feeding further research has led the academic literature to refer to research tools as: “enabling 
technologies” (Burk and Boettiger, 2004) or “platform-technologies” (Pray and Naseem, 
2005). 
 
Examples of research tools are many. For instance, the technique of recombinant DNA 
invented by Stanley Cohen and Robert Boyer is a research tool that has proved to be essential 
in the spawning of advances in molecular biology (National Research Council, 1997; Oliver 
and Liebeskind, 2003). This technique is essential in the manipulation of DNA segments but, 
in itself, it is not an application. It is of great usefulness only in upstream research tasks. 
Likewise, instruments in spectroscopy concerning the study of matter generate usefulness 
predominantly in research activities. The continued innovation in spectroscopy and the 
embodiment of this knowledge into scientific instruments has led to many advances (Riggs 
and von Hippel, 1994). Other examples of biotechnology research tools are polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR), high-throughput screening technologies, genomic databases, transgenic mice, 
modelling programs or knowledge of a target that is involved in a disease and as such 
represents a potential drug intervention. 
 
   4 In the context of sequential innovation, where the value of an invention may be in boosting 
further innovation, the question of the adequate patent dimension is as vital as it is delicate 
(Scotchmer, 1991; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Scotchmer, 1996; Bessen and Maskin, 2000; 
Scotchmer, 2004). A first generation research tool is an essential element to develop a second 
generation application. In this situation, the development of the application is not possible 
without the prior invention of the research tool. However, since commercial value usually 
resides in products that are developed later and not in the research tool itself, the invention of 
the research tool will only be rewarded if there is a part of appropriation of the returns from 
the sale of the application. A central point is hence to make sure that earlier innovators are 
compensated for their contribution, while ensuring that later innovators have also an incentive 
to innovate. 
 
Intellectual property can manage to organise the division of profit among sequential 
innovators. The patenting of the research tool allows for the negotiation of “reach-through” 
licensing terms between the two entities. Scotchmer (1991) insists on the importance of the 
scope of the research tool patent in determining the redistribution of the value from the sale of 
the second generation application. Too broad a patent will lead to excessive appropriation by 
the research tool inventor and insufficient returns for the second generation inventor. Whereas 
if it is too narrow, then the application may be able to work around altogether the research 
tool patent thus not rewarding the first generation inventor at all. In short, the design of 
patents is essential in ensuring sufficient incentives to invent for both the first and second 
generation inventors. 
 
Furthermore, the search process of research paths involves, by nature, uncertainty, since at the 
onset it is impossible for any one participant to foresee the most performing trajectory. As a 
matter of fact, a variety of participants will interpret differently what they believe to be the 
best path to pursue (Simon, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982). It is thus socially desirable in 
this context of uncertainty that numerous entities partake in the search of a particular research 
path in order to find the most performing one (Merges and Nelson, 1994). For this to be so, 
the research tools essential to the domain must not remain exclusive to a few so that there can 
be numerous forages into the research path (Nelson, 2004). In the language of the commons, 
research tools must be free in order to keep research paths open to numerous participants and 
a jubilant search process can hope to find the best paths to pursue. 
 
Yet, patents on research tools give rise to an element of control to the patent owner who has 
the choice to exert rights to exclude others from the concerned research paths. Therefore, 
research tool patents may influence the development of research tools and applications along 
technological trajectories (Dosi, 1988; David, 2004). Too wide patents may decrease 
incentives to set-up follow-on innovation because the latter may be held hostage by the first 
generation patent holder. Patents on research tools, and the consequent necessity of extensive 
licensing, invariably raise the cost for other participants to participate in the construction of a 
trajectory. If there are many such “toll booths” (David, 2004, p. 17) then it is likely that only 
the research paths that will lead to the highest and most certain payoffs will be trodden. Paths 
where the prospective payoffs may be bleaker or are of a highly exploratory and uncertain 
nature may not be pursued. In addition, the prospect of negotiating numerous licenses and the 
extensive transaction costs involved, such as legal fees, further put off participation in 
research paths that involve the licensing of many patents. Concerning the domain of 
biomedical science, this issue has been expressed as a potential “tragedy of the anticommons” 
where progress is hindered by the existence of multiple marginalisation, transaction costs and 
the potential breakdown of negotiations (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). 
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In short, with regard to biotechnology research tools, patents offer contrasted results. On the 
one hand, there is no doubt that they increase incentives to produce first generation 
innovation. It is widely acknowledged that patents are essential elements to spur biomedical 
innovation (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000). But on the other hand, there are concerns 
that in life science we may have gone too far into offering patent protection and that patents 
may increase the cost of access to research tools, which may preclude further second 
generation innovations (NRC, 1997; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Nelson, 2004; David, 2006). 
In a recent study, Walsh, Arora and Cohen (2003) do not find evidence of such a retard due to 
research tool patents, mainly because actors of the innovation process are able to develop 
“working solutions”
4. But the authors conclude that despite their reassuring finding, 
“aggressive patent behaviours can always threat scientific basic research”, which calls for “a 
continuous need for active defence of open science”. Free-libre biotechnology pursues this 
objective. Specifically, it aims at reconciling two apparently contradictory goals: (1) To 
provide incentives to economic actors to engage into the production of further research tools 
and (2) to ensure the freedom of the produced research tools. 
 
 
3. Free-libre biotechnology 
 
3.1 Definition, objectives and functioning 
 
In a recent paper Maurer (2003, p. 3) makes the following statement: “Several authors have 
recently suggested that a new method of doing science, variously called open source 
genomics, open source biology, or open source biotech is about to emerge. The idea is 
intriguing. Although currently confined to computer software, open source methods present 
an interesting alternative to traditional R&D institutions like intellectual property. So far, 
however, it is not clear what open source biology would actually look like. Articles describing 
open source biology typically point to (a) computer software written by and for biologists, or 
(b) projects where biologists publish data but waive intellectual property protection […] 
Somehow, one expects more”. 
 
Actually, Maurer et al. (2004, p. 183) envisage open source biotech as a: “decentralised web-
based, community-wide effort, where scientists from laboratories, universities, institutes, and 
corporations could work together for a common cause”. Hence, such an institution should be 
based on voluntary collaborations, it should be non-hierarchical and decentralized. While we 
fully agree on this description of free-libre biotech as involving collaboration among 
                                                 
4 “We find that there has in fact been an increase in patents on the inputs to drug discovery (“research tools”). 
However, we find that drug discovery has not been substantially impeded by these changes. We do not observe 
as much breakdown or even restricted access to research tools as one might expect because firms and universities 
have been able to develop “working solutions” that allow their research to proceed. These working solutions 
combine taking licenses, inventing around patents, infringement (often informally invoking a research 
exemption), developing and using public tools, and challenging patents in court […] Many of our responding 
firms suggested that if a research tool was critical, they would buy access to it. We also observe that most of 
what might be called “general  purpose” tools—tools that cut across numerous therapeutic and research 
applications that tend to be non-rival-in-use—tend to be licensed broadly” (Walsh, Arora and Cohen, 2003). 
Pray and Naseem (2005) also explored the consequences of patents in the development of rice genomics and 
plant transformation technologies. They also conclude that: “We find that patents were important in inducing 
private firms to develop these platform technologies […] We identified some examples of research that were 
slowed down by the patent on tools. However, our preliminary assessment of the evidence suggests that the 
benefits from patents on tools outweigh the costs” (Pray and Naseem, 2005, p 108). 
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open source biotechnology must be the freedom of access to the research. 
 
Following Lessig (2001), “a resource is “free” if (1) one can use it without the permission of 
anyone else; or (2) the permission one needs is granted neutrally” (Lessig, 2001; p. 12). This 
definition implies, among others, that the permission to access the resource is not granted at 
the discretion of an “owner”, who could therefore choose arbitrarily to refuse or grant access 
to others. With respect to upstream research tools this definition of freedom has one important 
consequence: The access to the “free” research tool needs not automatically to be free of 
charge but the research tool must be available on “reasonable terms”. Here, we converge with 
Nelson (2005, p. 137) who confesses that: “With respect to patented research tools created by 
industry research, my concern is less with open use at a fee, but with decisions not to make 
the tools widely available”. 
 
According to this definition, there can be free applications such as drugs for tropical diseases 
(Maurer et al., 2004) or free research tools such as plant transformation techniques in the case 
of the Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS initiative). The only requirement is that 
the artefact remains accessible for everybody under conditions that are not too difficult to 
meet and not discriminatory. In this pursuit of ensuring freedom to biotech research tools, 
organizational designs and numerous licenses analogous to those used in FLOSS can be 
ported from the software sector to the biotech one. 
 
First, it is important to notice that, in a sense, a patented research tool is by definition open 
source, since the application to a patent entails an obligation to disclose the innovation 
publicly. In this sense we prefer the term free-libre biotech to open source biotech, for the 
latter fails to emphasise the main purpose of the movement, which is not only the disclosure 
of the knowledge but also to ensure its freedom. One of the raison d'être of the patent system 
is to open the knowledge underlying inventions. Patent applications must contain an accurate 
description of the innovation which, eighteen month after the first application, is published, 
i.e. becomes available to everybody
5. Therefore, like open source software that are disclosed 
with their underlying source code, thus allowing other programmers to learn on them, patents 
contain a description of the innovation they intend to protect, therefore participating to the 
dissemination of the protected knowledge within the economy (Burk and Boettiger, 2004). 
This disclosure is specifically important in the case of cumulative innovations, for which 
secrecy would highly damage technological progress. 
 
Yet, when innovations are sequential, as for research tools and their applications, the 
disclosure of the knowledge underlying an innovation may not be sufficient. What is often 
needed is also that the upstream innovation itself is free so that the next stage innovation can 
be built upon it. This freedom may therefore be ensured by transposing some of the licenses 
that have proved workable in the case of free software. For instance, in the case of research 
collaboration this may simply concern the signing of a waiver agreement in which participants 
into the collaboration engage themselves not to patent their output, so that the latter remains 
free to re-use. This kind of agreement was used in the Alliance for Cell Signalling (Maurer et 
al., 2004)
6. A further license could be an “open access” type license (Guadamuz, 2006) in 
which licenses allow for the research tools to be openly accessible to all who wish to use 
them, without any constraint attached to the license. 
                                                 
5 This disclosure requirement is an obligation in all major countries but in the USA where national application 
with no international extensions can remain secret until the patent is granted. 
6 www.AFCS.org  
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Keep the whole platform open. Those open source licence may ensure the freedom of a 
research tool but not of all the follow-on research tools. Yet, we believe that the purpose of 
free-libre biotechnology must be to ensure the freedom of all research tools, to keep the whole 
platform open and not only some parts of it. It is not enough to make sure that one research 
tool cannot be appropriated but all the research tools related to a given technology must be 
kept free. 
 
In order to achieve the continued freedom of all research tools related to a given technology, 
patents can be used in a performance of legal jujitsu (Benkler, 2006). Patents can mimic 
copyleft type licenses by adopting a “grant back mechanism”, which would imply that users 
of patented research tools may be granted a license only if they agree to put further 
improvements under the free regime (Burk and Boettiger, 2004). Such a research tool license 
would therefore stipulates that users of research tools are required to grant back the rights on 
follow-on inventions to original inventors. Given that the original inventor chooses to license 
freely the research tools, this viral clause effectively guarantees that the sequence of 
innovations arising from a research tool will be enduringly free to re-use to all those who 
abide by the licensing terms. 
 
Compared to such viral licensing agreements, releasing merely the innovation into the public 
domain or granting an open access license are less efficient strategies. Indeed, the goal of 
free-libre biotechnology is to ensure the freedom not only of research tools but also of all the 
follow-on improvements stemming from this research tool. With respect to this purpose, 
releasing the research tool into the public domain, for instance, entails the risk that follow-on 
innovators appropriate some part of the set of research tools and therein control their use. 
 
The rationale in using open source licenses can be understood through the analogy with 
jujitsu, which is a martial art oriented toward active self defence. Jujitsu practitioners are 
never offenders but once they are attacked they practice an active and rather offensive 
defence. Having developed several skilful techniques, they are experts in using the strength of 
their adversaries to beat them. Similarly for free-libre biotech, patent owners use the strength 
of the patent system against its primary purpose. In line with the state of mind of martial art 
practitioners, free-libre biotechnology therefore suggests to use the patent system to prevent 
that entire streams of research are closed down by patent tickets. Research tool inventors, 
being aware of potential pitfalls in the delicate construction of a common knowledge base
7, 
refer to their capacity in legal jujitsu to guarantee the enduring freedom to re-use “their” 
research tools. By doing this they contribute to halting a “closeting off”, “blackening”, 
“controlling” of what we see as an essential “open, whitespace, free” layer of research tools. 
 
The following two examples of the BIOS initiative and the International HapMap project 
illustrate the application of these viral licenses that constitute the “third face” of IPRs 
according to David (2006). 
 
3.2 Two examples 
 
In the domain of agricultural biotechnology, the BIOS initiative – BIOS as Biological 
innovation for Open Society - aims at developing free plant transformation research tools in 
                                                 
7 In particular, the possibility that the patenting of complementary, follow-on inventions adds an element of 
control over the free resource, leading therefore to progressive appropriation of what was at the onset a collective 
knowledge base. 
   8 view of their re-use to create applications such as improved strains of crops. Specifically, the 
BIOS initiative tries developing a set of research tools that would operate freely of current 
patents on plant transformation methods. The BIOS initiative currently covers 12 research 
tools including the techniques of Transbacter and the popular GUS gene reporter. Those 
research tools are all patented and can be used only under specific conditions. In order to use 
them, a third party has to agree to the BIOS license that adopts a copyleft style “grant back 
mechanism” forcing the licensors into agreeing to share back to the BIOS initiative the rights 
to re-use the improvements that are made to BIOS research tools. In a dynamic perspective, 
this creates an environment: “in which a material or invention can be improved by the ideas of 
many, but access is maintained for all who agree to the terms, without exclusive capture by 
anyone” (BIOS homepage
8). Furthermore, although the use of BIOS patent is libre it may not 
necessarily be free of charge. Private members of OECD countries are required, in addition to 
agreeing with the licensing terms, to pay a participation fee. 
 
This viral clause of licensing implies that research tools that build on a technology patented 
by BIOS cannot be appropriated. Yet, this regards only upstream research tools. The 
treatment of applications derived from those research tools is completely different. 
Developers of potential applications of the BIOS research tools have the liberty to 
individually control new strains of plants, through patents if so wished. This frontier put to the 
free environment is linked to the specific features of innovation in biotech. As emphasized by 
Maurer et al. (2004), there has to be some appropriation in the innovation process so that, at 
the end, firms are encouraged to put end products on the market. Indeed, although prices for 
equipment in biotechnology may be declining, there remain large costs in the development of 
biotech applications, such as the testing of drugs (Lerner and Tirole, 2004). Those costs mean 
that an organization that is based solely on the decentralized contributions by a community of 
private, garage-based scientists with intrinsic and, limited, extrinsic motivations, is unlikely to 
reach the commercial success of FLOSS projects. The BIOS initiative aims therefore at 
preserving the freedom only of upstream research tools, without impeding the commercial 
exploitation of their direct applications. 
 
A similar kind of license that tries to dynamically protect the freedom of the sequence of 
developments of a research tool was used in the domain of human genetics by the 
International HapMap project. This project aimed at developing a database of haplotypes, 
which consist of variations in the human genome that can help researchers to inquire into 
hereditary, genetic diseases. The value of this data is in comparing multiple genomes from 
around the world. Therefore it requires collaboration between numerous laboratories around 
the world and it is essential that all haplotype information remains in one single database. 
However, during the construction of the database there is a risk that individual parties 
appropriate parts of the database either through patents or through database laws. 
 
Therefore, a specific licensing agreement was designed with the aim of preserving the free use 
of the entire database. The HapMap license requires, instead of royalties, that the user of the 
database agrees not to appropriate the database, nor to exclude other parties from using the 
data. In addition, if the user passes on the data to a third party, the same license would apply, 
as well. In other words, the HapMap license tries to defend the free re-use of the database by 
                                                 
8 http://www.bios.net (accessed [09/17/06]). It is further mentioned on the website that: “Instead of royalties, 
BIOS licensees must agree to legally binding conditions in order to obtain a license and access to the protected 
commons. These conditions are that improvements are shared and that licensees cannot appropriate the 
fundamental kernel of the technology and improvements exclusively for themselves”. 
   9 blocking property rights that might affect its free re-use and is enduring in the sense that it 
reproduces itself with all uses of the data.  
 
3.3 Where do we go from here? 
 
Free-libre biotechnology has been compared to jujitsu. Yet, in martial arts, like all practices, 
there is a necessary preparation time or “training” before the correct performance can be 
attained. Although legal attacks on the GPL today seem to be adequately countered by the 
FLOSS movement, which has never seemed so strong, this rests much on the work of the 
FLOSS community over the last 20 years. The ex-ante job of developing the licensing 
mechanisms, of convincing the actors, of reconciling the incentives of the community with the 
pursuit of a particular project, etc., entails sunk costs and implies that such communities can 
only become operational after a long preparation time. One of the first and major tasks to 
implement free-libre biotech will hence be to imagine and design licences that are likely to be 
accepted by most players in the field. Well designed open-source licenses are central for the 
viability of free-libre biotechnology. 
 
For instance, the case of BIOS licenses is very much tailored to the fact that the mother-owner 
CAMBIA (for Centre for the Application of Molecular Biology to International Agriculture) 
owned valuable intellectual property to build on and that the domain allows separating the 
application from the research tool (basically, new plants are applications and everything to 
make possible a new plant is research tool). Furthermore, in this case the potential problem of 
appropriating follow-on, complementary research tools was clearly identified by designers of 
the licence, who therefore effectively reacted through the design of a license that has 
particular demands concerning the appropriation of these improvements and the rights to their 
re-use. In this way, BIOS is able to guarantee that the research tools and continued 
development is enduringly free. But other contexts will be different and will require subtle 
modifications to the license. It may not be so easy to separate a free layer from the controlled 
layer as other situations may require more upstream appropriation due to the necessary 
investments to develop research tools. 
 
A further need of biotechnology open source license shall deal with the specificities of the 
biotech field as compared to software. Licenses will have to consider the fact that research in 
biotech is often more costly than in software, where the sole cost for programmers is often the 
time they spent in front of their machines. Also, licenses shall be clearly oriented toward 
business. Free-libre biotechnology can only work if there is alternative opportunity of profits. 
As established by J. Hope (2003): “Key issues for advancing the open source biology analysis 
will be developing open source patent licenses and other licenses appropriate for biological 
subject matter assessing the importance of higher capital costs in biotech development and 
establishing whether or not there exist secondary markets for biotech services or other 
commercial offerings that might support business models along the lines that have proved 
successful in the software context”. As illustrated by the BIOS case, free-libre biotech does 
not aim at ensuring the freedom of all life science products. Only upstream research tools 
need to be free. 
 
A further and highly important part of the preparation stage will involve the diffusion of the 
licenses within the domain. Although single efforts are to be acknowledged for their 
individual worth, a collective innovation process means that there would have to be a 
commonality in the use of free licenses. Much as norms and rules are situated within 
communities, the adoption of open source licenses is likely to be localized in communities. 
   10 How this may spread through from community to community of different typologies is an 
interesting question to be pursued. 
 
To summarise, we discussed here an original way to use the patent system. Contrary to its 
primary purpose, which is to exclude potential imitators and thus to enable innovators to 
appropriate their innovation, patents may also preclude appropriation and ensure the freedom 
of innovations. How can we reconcile this original use of patents with more traditional ones? 
Economic theory has indeed identified many different rationales for the patent system. It has 
been shown that patents may increase incentives to invest in innovative activities (the 
traditional arrovian argument), contribute to disseminating knowledge within an economy, 
help create a market for technologies (Arora and Fosfuri, 2000; Arora, Fosfuri and 
Gambardella, 2000), ease inter firms negotiations and collaborations (Bureth et al., 2005) or 
signal competences (Pénin, 2005). Our goal in the next section is to construct a unified 
framework to analyse the role of patents with respect to biotech research tools. We propose 
that each particular use of patents may correspond to a specific situation that depends on the 
properties of research tools. 
 
 
4. A unified framework to analyse research tool patents 
 
4.1 Conceptualizing research tools 
 
The variety of economic properties that one can attribute to research tools leads to subtleties 
in their analysis. In order to highlight the nuances, we shall examine research tools along two 
principal dimensions: First, we can consider research tools as being information, such as in 
the seminal work of Arrow (1962), or as being knowledge, following Nelson and Winter 
(1982). Second, research tools can be depicted as either independent or complementary inputs 
in the development of downstream applications. 
 
Independent vs. complementary research tools 
A first dimension that is central to understand the variety of research tools deals with their 
independent vs. complementary nature. An independent research tool can be used alone into 
the development of an application. It does not need to be combined with other research tools. 
Conversely, complementary research tools cannot be used by themselves. They are useful to 
develop applications only when they are combined with other research tools. As such, 
independent research tools have a direct value to their users while a research tool that is 
complementary: “has no value to the user at all unless the user has access to its complements” 
(Scotchmer, 2004, p. 144). 
 
This design element of research tools as either an individual input or as complementary inputs 
affects the interdependency between research tool producers and developers of applications. 
On the one hand, an individual input leads to a simple one-to-one interaction between a 
research tool producer and potential developers. Hence, the latter may not need to bargain 
with several different research tools producers, which highly facilitates the development of 
applications. On the other hand, the design element of complementary research tools means 
that multiple inputs are required to develop a particular application. Therefore, developers 
will have to bargain with many different research tools producers, which may increase the 
overall price to develop applications and even jeopardize the development of some 
applications. 
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A second essential dimension of research tools deals with their contents, which can be 
assimilated either to information or to knowledge. In the former case, production and 
diffusion of research tools can be modelled by using the seminal framework defined by Arrow 
(1962). When considered as information, research tools share to some extent the properties of 
a public good. First, the research tool is non-rival in use, i.e. one person's using the research 
tool does not prohibit another from using the same research tool. Second, when considered as 
being information the research tool is non-exclusive, i.e. it is very difficult or even impossible 
to exclude individuals from re-using it. 
 
Therefore, to consider research tools as information leads to a classical problem of incentives. 
Since new knowledge can hardly be appropriable by the innovator, incentives to invest in 
R&D are low and there will be an under-investment of resources into the invention of new 
research tools as compared to society's preferred level. Hence there is a rationale for state 
intervention to correct under-investment in research tools. 
 
Assimilating research tools to knowledge leads to a quite different picture. The public good 
problem is not relevant any more, since knowledge is usually sticky, i.e. it is embodied within 
its holder and benefits other individuals only after a long and costly work of transmission and 
assimilation. To absorb some knowledge that is transmitted by a given source requires a 
cognitive re-appropriation by the receptor, which means that knowledge is, in a sense, 
“personal” (Polanyi, 1958). It cannot be fully replicated and transferred from one individual to 
another. Therefore, knowledge is to some extent appropriable or, at least, does not benefit 
other individuals easily. 
 
When considering research tools as knowledge based, the inventor and society no longer face 
the prospect of the provision of a new public good. In this case, the challenge rather concerns 
the intricate task of the transmission of the research tool. In particular, the transmission of the 
knowledge based research tool may require a costly process of codification (Cowan et al., 
2000). Furthermore, in order to be able to use the research tool, the user is also required to be 
endowed with the necessary knowledge to understand the message and to absorb the 
knowledge embodied in the research tool (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Undertaking the 
transmission process of the research tool is therefore an essential but resource-consuming step 
for the inventor and the user(s). 
 
For the research tool inventor, the priority is now to manage the transfer of his knowledge for 
its re-use in the development of an application. In this task, the fundamental problem is how 
to make oneself understood. Much as the musician who is new on the scene is required to play 
his music otherwise no one will listen and possibly enjoy it, inventors must undertake 
repeated investment in making themselves known and understood through “garnering 
interest” to their knowledge (Callon, 1999). Accordingly, this task requires making the 
research tool understandable as well as the enrolment of application developers to pay 
attention to the knowledge in view of its understanding and re-use (Amin and Cohendet, 
2004). It is only after such a collaborative work that there is the possibility of coordinating the 
development of an application. Conversely, by considering research tools as information, this 
vital collaborative process of the inventor garnering interest is abstracted from the diffusion of 
research tools
9. 
                                                 
9 The distinction we draw between knowledge and information can be understood through the difference 
between emergent and stable situations (Callon, 1999). Regarding research tools as information implies that we 
consider a stable environment where actors and techniques are known, i.e. research tools can be diffused easily. 
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In this context of research tools as knowledge, the risk is therefore that research tool inventors 
and users fail to construct a common knowledge base that makes the development of 
applications possible. The rationale for state intervention rests here on solving issues of 
collaboration between the actors with at the root the problem involving the transfer of the 
research tool from inventor to user(s). To summarise, one can represent research tools along 
two dimensions: information vs. knowledge based and individual vs. complementary. 
Crossing those two dimensions leads to four different conceptualizations of research tools. 
 
Table 1: A quadrant to conceptualize research tools 
 
Research tools as  Independent Complementary 










I.  This configuration, where research tools are used individually and can be 
assimilated to information, corresponds to the traditional arrovian framework. 
Research tools are easily reproducible by a technician without any need of 
assistance, which implies that the main concern deals with incentives to produce 
such research tools since, as emphasised above, their appropriation is not 
straightforward. Exchange of those research tools on a market are typically 
confronted to the paradox of Arrow (1962). The difficulties to sell such research 
tools to users and therefore to make money out of the research tools may decrease 
the incentives to produce them. 
 
II.  This second configuration depicts research tools as being information and 
complementary. An example of such research tools is Polymerase Chain Reaction 
(NRC, 1997; Fore et al., 2006). In the domain of molecular biology the use of 
PCR has applications in domains such as diagnosis of hereditary diseases or 
forensics. PCR is a complementary research tool in the sense that it can not be 
performed without the use of other research tools- the technique, material and 
instrument. Yet, these research tools can be easily transferred and re-used by mere 
technicians, which makes them comparable to information. Here the major 
concern deals not only with incentives but also with coordination problems, since 
for the user it is necessary to assemble many research tools. A deficit of 
coordination among the different producers and users may prevent the 
development of some applications. 
                                                                                                                                                          
Conversely, regarding research tools as knowledge means that we consider emergent stages, where an uncertain 
environment make processes of translation and enrolment all the more important. In such emergent stages, there 
is uncertainty with respect to the nature of the development of the research tool, since its potential value, uses 
and quality are not known and since the inventor himself is unknown (Cohendet et al., 2006). In this context of 
heightened uncertainty, the diffusion of knowledge will be inhibited as a common knowledge base of the 
“embryonic” research tools is yet to be constructed (Amin and Cohendet, 2004). Actors must undertake the 
costly understanding of research tools with no idea about the research tool or the environment it will be used in. 
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III.  Considering research tools as being independent and knowledge based emphasises 
the importance of collaboration among users and producers. Conversely to former 
cases, here the use of research tools is not possible without the assistance of the 
inventor or a trained engineer endowed with the personal knowledge to operate the 
research tool. There is little free-riding possible. Concerning the knowledge 
embodied in the instrument, the understanding of the artefact's intricacies remains 
the sole possession of the inventor, who therefore controls the reproduction of the 
instrument. It is only after an effort of learning that the user will be able to operate 
the research tool. The major concern here has shifted from incentives problems to 
problems of transfer of the research tool. It is necessary to set up a tight 
cooperation among producers and users in order to transfer the knowledge based 
research tool. The keyword here is therefore collaboration. 
 
IV.  Finally, research tools can be viewed as knowledge and complementary. This can 
be, for instance, research tools concerning plant transformation, in the domain of 
agricultural biotechnology, in which the BIOS initiative was developed. In this 
case, the problem is to develop and preserve a common base of knowledge to use 
the research tools. Applications can only be derived from a tight collaboration 
among all the research tools producers and application developers. This 
configuration may therefore correspond to what several authors refer to collective 
invention (Allen, 1983; Schrader, 1991; Nuvolari, 2001). 
 
We have proposed here a classification of research tools into four categories. In the next 
section, we shall demonstrate, through this depiction of different conceptualizations of 
research tools, the varied uses of the patent. Depending on the information or knowledge and 
the independent or complementary view, the patenting of research tools follows either a 
classical logic of appropriation or a logic of collaboration and even of liberation of the 
patented knowledge. 
 
4.2 Different roles for research tool patents 
 
Independent and information based research tools: Incentives 
The upper-left part of the quadrant depicts the traditional arrovian framework. Research tools 
are information, which implies that their commercialisation will be confronted to the paradox 
enounced by Arrow (1962), which can be summarised as follows: The decision to purchase 
and use a research tool depends on the user’s ability to measure up its value and, thus, on 
possessing the information. But, if the information is already possessed by the user then there 
is no need for him to buy it anymore (Arrow, 1962). The characteristic of information as an 
economic good undermines the possibility to trade research tools on a market
10. Hence, in this 
basic configuration, without property rights producers can hardly trade research tools to users. 
Since only the latter can derive profit out of the research tool, incentives to invest into the 
creation of first generation research tools remain very low. 
 
                                                 
10 A famous illustration of this problem is given by Tirole (2003, p. 23) who tells us the story of Robert Kearns, 
the inventor of the windshield wiper. Having no possibilities to commercialise alone his invention Robert Kearns 
proposed collaboration to Ford, to whom he disclosed the idea and some of the technical aspects. Ford refused 
the collaboration and some time later introduced on the market a similar product with only slight technological 
differences. 
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and revealing inherent to a patent are essential with respect to the implementation of a market 
for information. The coupling of these two properties of disclosure and protection allows in 
some sense to solve the Arrow’s paradox (1962). Patents both disclose and protect 
information, thus preventing free riding from occurring. They enable innovators to sell their 
innovation with the peace of mind that no entity will “hijack” it. Therefore, paradoxically, 
property rights may often favour information transfer. In a sense, the patent system allows the 
creation of a market for technologies and highly codified knowledge (Arora and Fosfuri, 
2000; Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2000). 
 
Patents effectively allow the research tool inventor to commodify his invention by stipulating 
the conditions of its re-use. In a sense patents enable the separation between users and 
producers allowing therefore gains in specialisation by the respective entities. In this context, 
the inexistence of patents would mean that the same entity would have to be both the producer 
and the user of the research tool. Patents provide incentives for some firm to specialise in the 
production of research tools, to patent their research tools and then, to sell them to users 
through licensing contracts that specify the price and the terms of the transaction
11. As 
emphasised by Scotchmer (2004), within this simple configuration patents enable the sharing 
of the benefits along the invention chain, allowing remunerating upstream inventors, who 
would not be induced to invent otherwise. Patents permit the development of second 
generation applications and to re-distribute some part of the profits to the first generation 
research tool’s inventor. 
 
Yet, economic theory has also extensively demonstrated that the element of exclusivity 
granted to the patent owner generates a dead-weigh monopoly loss for society. Monopoly 
pricing will lead to under-using the research tool as compared with an ideal, i.e. some 
applications may not be implemented although socially desirable. This dead-weigh loss is 
usually considered as the price to pay on the short run to ensure ongoing technological 
progress and therefore increased welfare on the long run. To summarise, when research tools 
are considered as being information and independent, patents are a central device to share the 
benefits among innovators and to ensure that there will be investments in both first and 
second generation products whenever the benefits outweigh the costs. 
 
Complementary and information based research tools: coordination 
The upper-right part of the quadrant views research tools as being information based but 
complementary, which means that a user will need to combine different research tools and 
that one single research tool without its complements has no value at all for its user. In this 
case, there is still a problem of incentives and distribution of profit that can be solved by the 
implementation of a patent system as described above. But beyond this problem of incentives 
there is also a problem of coordination among the research tool users and the different 
producers. 
 
This need of coordination can be solved (at least partly) by the patent system. Indeed, patents, 
by creating a market for research tools, may be a powerful device to coordinate innovative 
activities and to ensure that users can access all research tools. It is a central axiom of 
                                                 
11 The drug development industry is a prime example where division of labour induced by patents has changed 
completely the organisation of research. Typically in the 1980s and 1990s, the biotech paradigm generated a 
division of labour between biotechnology firms specialised in drug discovery techniques on the one hand and 
pharmaceutical companies specialised in bringing the end-applications to market on the other hand. Patents help 
to structure the transactions among those two worlds by easing the transfer of patented new molecules.  
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inventions allows the market to be the coordination device for bringing together a large 
number of upstream sellers of research tools and buyers looking for developing applications. 
This allows a powerful decentralised guidance through price signals on research tool licenses. 
The prospect of selling licenses guides research tool inventors as these licenses enable the 
important re-distribution of the profits from the development of the second generation 
applications. 
 
However, here the implementation of application may be confronted to a problem of 
“anticommons” (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). The expression “tragedy of the anticommons” 
relies on the notion of “tragedy of the commons” stressed by Hardin (1968). As stated by this 
biologist, the lack of property rights on a common good can lead, if the good is used above its 
regenerative capacities, to its entire destruction. The idea of the anti-common tragedy deals 
with the exact reverse problem. In the case of fragmented property rights over a resource there 
is a risk of suboptimal use of this resource due to the addition of monopoly situations that 
may lead to too high an overall price to exploit the resource. A tragedy of the anti-commons 
therefore means that an application derived from research tools may not be implemented due 
to too high a price induced by the addition of monopoly positions on intermediate research 
tools. 
 
A tragedy of the anticommons may therefore arise when an application requires the 
combination of a high number of research tools, each of them being patented and therefore 
sold independently of the others. This multiplication of transactions leads first, to an increase 
of transaction costs, the users of research tools being obliged to negotiate a license with each 
producer independently. But, most of all, this leads to a problem of multiple marginalisation, 
which was first raised by Cournot (1838) in his seminal contribution on the pricing of 
complementary intermediate goods
12. Following Cournot, a surprising conclusion about 
licensing complementary goods is that the joint price is lower if they are sold as a unit by a 
single owner. Not only does collusion among research tool producers increases their profits, 
but it also decreases the overall price, thus benefiting users too (Cournot, 1838). 
 
It is therefore in the interest of society that policy makers watch the risk of anticommons and, 
if necessary, try to improve interactions among research tools producers in order to decrease 
the overall price of developing applications. One widely debated solution to problems of 
anticommons lies in the implementation of patent pools. A patent pool is an agreement 
between two and more patent owners to licence one or more of their patents to another third 
parties, set-up specifically to administer the patent pool. Hence, patent users, instead of 
having to bargain access with several independent owners will have to negotiate access only 
with one single entity that is in charge of all the relevant patents. 
 
Patent pools may therefore decrease transaction costs as well as multiple marginalisation 
problems. Yet, two problems may affect the benefits of patent pools for society. First, costs 
                                                 
12 Cournot (1838) showed that, in the case of complementary intermediate goods, sometimes one unique 
supplier (who has a monopoly position) is better for the overall social surplus than an addition of several 
independent suppliers. The explanation relies on the existence of negative externalities. When a research tool 
producer increases his price, he decreases the demand for research tools, which affects other research tool 
producers. This negative externality implies that independent research tool producers will tend to ask too high 
prices for their research tools as compared with an ideal. Collusion among research tool producers may hence 
force them to internalise the externality and therefore to decrease the price of each research tool and the overall 
price to develop applications. 
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producers may bargain to set-up the patent pool. Second, public authorities must be very 
careful with anticompetitive behaviours. There is indeed a conflict between the formation of 
patent pools and antitrust policies. It is possible that patent pools are implemented not to solve 
anticommons but merely to decrease competition and to increase the margins of firms in the 
pool. Standard economic theory shows that patent pools are procompetitive and welfare 
increasing when gathering complementary patents but welfare decreasing when gathering 
substitute patents. 
 
Independent and knowledge based research tools: Collaboration 
So far, we have considered research tools as being information based and as such we have 
supposed that they shared, at least to some extent, the properties of a public good. This may 
be the case for generic knowledge already disseminated within an economy. Yet, in the case 
of emerging and radically new techniques it is doubtful that those two properties are satisfied. 
As argued by Callon (1993), a more detailed study of knowledge economic property tends to 
reverse the issue. The problem for innovators is less a capacity to claim ownership over 
knowledge, than being able to diffuse it, to explain it to others. The tacit aspect of knowledge 
gives rise to a problem therefore opposite to that raised by the classical theory. During the 
first phase of the creation of an innovation, when common language and schemes do not yet 
exist, knowledge is marked by strong rivalry (it is hard to reproduce it outside the local 
context where the discovery has been made) and strong exclusivity (the invention is linked to 
the tacit knowledge of the inventor). 
 
In terms of risks for the innovator, it is therefore less likely that problems of free riders might 
occur than problems of not making himself understood and therefore of not being able to 
implement the new techniques due to a lack of common cognitive grounds. Any attempt to 
disseminate and therefore to trade a research tool requires important and difficult preliminary 
work, as knowledge tends to adhere to its human support; it is most of the time “sticky”. This 
leads to reconsidering in depth the issue of research tools production and utilisation and the 
role of patents. As argued by Cohendet et al. (2006), in a knowledge based context, strategies 
of collaboration tend to overcome strategies of exclusion. 
 
As soon as research tools are considered as knowledge, the central concern is shifted from 
incentives and coordination problems to collaboration issues. It is only through in depth 
interaction among users and producers that research tools can be transferred. Mere licensing 
agreements are not sufficient to ensure the transfer of research tools because users usually do 
not have the ability to exploit them. They need assistance and face to face interactions to learn 
how to use the new technique. This does not mean that patents will be useless but it radically 
changes the role of patents and the way in which firms use their patent portfolios. 
 
In a knowledge based context it is more important for innovators to ensure the diffusion of 
their innovation, to make them understood than to prevent imitation. Patents therefore are not 
used as tools of protection and exclusion to market technologies but rather as devices to 
collaborate and to diffuse knowledge. It is only when techniques become more mature and 
languages are shared, that the importance of patents as an instrument of exclusion increases. 
 
Patents may enable collaborations and therefore facilitate the exchange of tacit knowledge 
through various mechanisms. First, patents may facilitate collaboration between research tool 
producers and users because they help partners to identify each other. Indeed, all patent 
applications are published eighteen months after the first application, which means that by 
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patents is all the more important as firms evolve in a context of incomplete information, 
usually not being able to infer what other firms are doing. For isolated research tool 
producers, patenting their technology may therefore be a way to advertise it and to ease the 
finding of users (Pénin, 2005). 
 
Second, patents are a way to structure complex interactions among firms. They constitute 
legal devices that can help to structure collaborations and facilitate negotiations between 
research tool users and producers. For instance, patents reduce the risks linked to 
collaboration, therefore inducing firms to participate in the venture. Indeed, R&D cooperation 
is a risky process in the sense that participants must often share parts of their most important 
intellectual assets. Since patents protect the knowledge held by a firm from plundering by her 
partners, they decrease the risk of opportunistic behaviours and of hold up of competences. It 
follows that firms protected by patents may be more willing to be involved in R&D 
cooperation (Ordover, 1991). Furthermore, patents may also ease the transfer of the tacit 
component of technologies by including clauses of assistance and of exchange of employees 
in licensing contracts (Foray, 2004). In this sense patents are not only devices to market 
technologies but they structure more in-depth interactions between research tool users and 
producers. They provide a legal framework for trading tacit knowledge. Finally, all along the 
collaboration, a patent can assist heterogeneous partners because they provide a common 
language that can be understood by many. A patent is therefore a key element in a shared 
culture, a prerequisite to bringing together actors around a common project. This is especially 
true for university-industry relationships, for which cultural differences may sometimes 
complicate the transfer of technology. 
 
In conclusion, when research tools are considered as knowledge their transfer is more 
complex than when they are assumed to be mere information. Yet, patents can assist the 
exchange of knowledge based research tools between producers and users by signalling the 
research tool to potential users and by structuring complex transactions and collaborations. 




Complementary and knowledge based research tools: Collective invention 
Considering research tools as knowledge based and complementary reveals not only the issue 
of making oneself understood but also, in a context of uncertainty and multiple interactions, 
the importance of the construction of common knowledge bases. Not only is knowledge 
sticky, but the exploitation of a research tool requires the combination with many other 
research tools, i.e. users will have to collaborate with many producers. The key-point here is 
                                                 
13 For instance, Bureth, Pénin and Wolff (2006) consider the case of a small Alsatian start-up involved in the 
development and commercialisation of chemical based vectors that serve to transfer genes or other bio-
molecules (proteins for instance) within cells in-vivo or in-vitro. Vectors are clearly research tools since they are 
useful for the development of follow-on medical applications. The vectors invented by this start-up are all 
patented. Furthermore, the firm is currently engaged in an important project of vaccine against HIV with US 
partners. The role of the start-up is to provide the vectors necessary to transfer the antigens and therefore to 
trigger the production of antibodies. Interviews with several executive managers of the start-up all suggest that 
patents played a central role in the collaboration: First, it is by screening patent databases that the US partners 
discovered the existence of the small Alsatian start-up. This clearly emphasises the importance of the signalling 
dimension of patents. Second, patents were important during the negotiation in order to smooth the difference of 
size between the partners. They provided the background for the negotiations. Here is therefore an example of 
transfer of research tools through tight collaboration made possible by the patent system. 
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applications can be generated. 
 
Since applications can only be based upon full access to this common platform of knowledge 
formed by all the research tools, the open dimension of the platform is central in order to 
allow its access at the lowest cost. In collective invention knowledge is re-used and partakes 
in a plurality of research potentially leading to numerous new research tools and downstream 
applications. Research tools as a free-libre resource is where researchers are able to 
unabashedly tinker and experiment without the necessary permission of “someone”. This 
whitespace is the vital open and unobstructed part of the researcher's workspace used for 
creative endeavours. This research workspace can be seen as the layer preceding the 
development of follow-on inventions, i.e. the application layer. The importance of openness 
in such a complex and sequential innovation process was recently emphasised by Nelson 
(2004, p. 463), who reminds us that: “I do not know of a field of science where knowledge 
has increased cumulatively that has not been basically open”. 
 
Yet, if the workspace is controlled through property rights then this will most likely narrow 
the domains of researchers as they will be forced down paths based on financial value and 
exclusive negotiations rather than on the creative value of the applications. Fragmentation and 
appropriation of the common knowledge base increases the cost of accessing it and therefore 
impedes the development of follow-on applications. Taking this perspective of research tools 
as knowledge and complementary leads therefore to identifying a problem of patents as 
potentially augmenting the difficulties to access existing knowledge, thus hindering the 
construction of a collective process of innovation. This is all the more relevant given the 
complementary nature of research tools, making each of them central in the development of 
applications. In the language of the commons, what would benefit extremely from being a 
free resource has a large propensity to be controlled through the attribution of patent rights on 
essential elements (complementary research tools). 
 
In short, it is sometimes feared that patents may jeopardize the emergence of applications 
because they undermine the common platform of knowledge necessary to ensure interactions 
among research tool users and producers. The complementary nature of research tools and the 
need to re-use them in the attempt to form an understanding and develop designs, interfaces 
and standards, may be impeded by the use of aggressive patent strategies. 
 
But, and this is the central idea defended in this paper, it is also possible that patents help to 
preserve the openness of the commons. The protection granted to the patent owner can serve 
to preserve the openness of a research tool and can therefore foster collaborations and 
exchanges among research tool users and producers. In this sense, research tool producers do 
not use their patents to exclude imitators but to ensure the freedom of use of the research in 
the domain. Hence, it is in this context of complementary and knowledge based research 
tools, in which it is central to preserve the openness of all first stage research to foster the 
development of applications, that the use of patents to preserve the freedom of first stage 
research may be necessary and that free-libre biotech may be a helpful concept. 
 
To summarize, conceptualizing research tools in subtly different ways helps to understand the 
underlying rationale for the various uses of patents. Among others, based on the intuitions 
from the quadrant we developed a theoretical rationale for free-libre biotechnology. Taking 
the perspective of research tools as being information leads to an understanding of the 
paradox of Arrow and of the problem of appropriability, which the patent may solve. But in 
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research tools as knowledge reveals the issue of the necessity to build a common knowledge 
base on which research tool users and producers will be able to interact. It is within this latter 





This paper dealt with the availability of upstream research tools and the role of patents to 
ensure or to hinder their accessibility. This issue is central since, on the one hand there is a 
strong and steady trend towards patenting upstream research in life science, and on the other 
hand in upstream domains it is central to preserve a minimum level of freedom to foster the 
production of downstream applications. It is therefore important to implement policy levers to 
ensure both that individuals have strong incentives to produce research tools and that those 
research tools are easily available to users. Our work on how patents may help to preserve 
freedom of upstream research can reconcile those two apparently contrasted objectives. 
 
Patents do not automatically prevent access to biotechnology research tools. Making the 
analogy with FLOSS, we showed that patents can also be used in order to help making first 
stage innovation free and thus to facilitate the production of second stage innovations. One 
can operate the same hijacking of patents as has been done with the copyright to transform it 
into the so-called “copyleft”. The underlying approach to intellectual property rights that is 
embodied in FLOSS can serve as the inspirational basis for numerous free-libre 
biotechnology licenses that refer to how the rights to re-use an invention are attributed. 
 
At one extreme, patents can be used to secure technology and to prevent other firms from 
using it but, at the other extreme they can serve to ensure the ongoing freedom of a specific 
stream of technology. The question we addressed then was when we shall observe a use of 
patents as instrument of exclusion and when we shall observe a use of patents as instrument to 
ensure free access. By crossing two dimensions of research tools – complementary vs. 
independent and information vs. knowledge based- we analysed four different situations in 
which patents may play very different roles. Specifically, we focused on the extreme case of 
collective invention, which appeared to us as a likely situation in which free-libre 
biotechnology may develop. 
 
In conclusion, this paper showed that patents are very complex instruments that should not be 
reduced merely to tools of exclusion. Yet, some sceptical readers may want to question the 
applicability of free-libre biotechnology in reality. Our answer is twofold: First, such models 
of free-libre biotech already exist in reality as illustrated by the example of BIOS. Second, we 
do not pretend that free-libre biotech is the solution that should be implemented in all 
contexts. Rather, we tried to identify specific contexts in which this concept shall work
14.  
 
                                                 
14 And we believe that this promising concept may be workable in some contexts. For instance, Janet Hope 
(2003) gives the following plausible scenario: Consider a small biotech company that generates revenue by 
exploiting a patenting technology. Only a small fraction of its revenues directly comes from licensing. The major 
source of revenue is derived from performing contract research and services. This company is engaging in 
research and development activities to improve the technology platform on which it is generating revenues. 
According to Hope, this imaginary company is likely to be a good candidate for participating to free-libre 
biotechnology. First, it is not making money directly on its patents. Second, it may gain highly by improving its 
technology platform on which it is generating most of its revenues. 
   20 Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that free-libre biotechnology focuses on the objective of 
protecting the freedom of the whole upstream platform of research tools whilst at the same 
time allowing for the generation of applications. Therefore, only the first stage researches that 
are essential to the development of applications must remain open. Applications do not need 
to be free, on the contrary, they will only be undertaken by firms if they are patented and can 
provide their owners with a competitive advantage. Ativities that are not considered as 
upstream can be appropriated. So in BIOS, legal control of the application layer is permitted. 
Or in the HapMap, the patenting of specificities is allowed. A fine balance between 'free' 
research tool and 'controlled' application must therefore be found and respected. 
 
Free-libre biotechnology is not wishful thinking and has real chance to be adopted in specific 
contexts. Yet, some questions must still be addressed on the role of patents as instrument to 
preserve the freedom of technologies. Here are two important points that will have to be 
clarified in future research: 
 
First, it is likely that there is a threshold in the size of the patent pool above which it is almost 
certain that the freedom of the entire field will be preserved. Due to the viral property of the 
licence, once a critical mass will be attained, the choice to agree or not to the licensing terms 
will then be made obvious. Indeed, as long as the pool is small and other firms can do without 
using patents that are in the pool, the pool will grow slowly and eventually will never impose 
itself. But as soon as the pool is big enough so that it cannot or it would be too costly to get 
around, then firms will have to use patents in the pool and therefore will have to agree on the 
terms of access of those patents. And the more firms use patents in the pool, the more patents 
are given back into the pool, thus contributing to increasing it and to reinforcing this size 
effect. To study this threshold effect, it may therefore be interesting to apply models of 
increasing return of adoption à la Arthur (1989). Related to this point it is also possible that 
the quality of the patent may replace the quantity. Even though the pool is small, if it 
encompasses one patent that is central in the field then it may also grow continuously. This 
was the case of the BIOS initiative, the success of which was partly due to the fact that the 
initiator already held one of the most important patents in the field and that many actors 
needed this patent. 
 
The second central issue deals with drawing the borders between what is a research tool and 
what is an application. Put it otherwise, between what cannot be appropriated and must be put 
back into the pool and what can be patented and exploited individually by a firm. This 
question is central because it will determine the incentives of profit driven organisations to 
invest in research tools and to participate in free-libre biotechnology. As illustrated by the 
BIOS case, some things need to be appropriable in order to allow firms to make money. It is 
hence very delicate to establish the barrier between things that must remain free because they 
are essential to spur further applications and things that can be appropriable. It is doubtful that 
there exists a simple rule to draw the border between the two. It is rather likely that this line is 
different for each situation. But maybe is it possible to find out regular and general patterns 
that may help to identify this border. 
 
Finally we would like to end this paper with a discussion on the consequences our work may 
have on “open science”. It is indeed undisputable that patents have now entered the open 
science fortress and that most universities in the US and in Europe are widely patenting their 
research (Sampat and Ziedonis, 2001; Stephan, Sumell and Black, 2001; Cesaroni and 
Piccaluga, 2002; Mazzoleni and Sampat, 2002; Mowery, Nelson, Mowery and Ziedonis, 
2002; Carayol and Matt, 2004). Many studies have documented the reasons and the 
   21 consequences of this trend. Among others, concerns are dealing with the availability of 
academic research and with the long run dynamics of innovation. Most fears are coming from 
an aggressive and exclusive use of their patent portfolios by universities. Yet, our work 
suggests another possible way for universities and public research centres to use their patents. 
It is possible that patents reconcile incentives to do research and wide diffusion of those 
researches. The fact that patents can be compatible with a wide dissemination of technologies 
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